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This report has two main objectives. The first is to outline the development of the 
methodology for the measurement of economic security in the Index of Economic Well-
being (IEWB) and to provide updated estimates of the Index of Economic Security over 
the 1980-2007 period for seven developed countries: Canada, Australia, Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The four components of the 
economic security domain of the IEWB – security from unemployment, illness, single-
parent poverty, and old-age poverty – are discussed.  
 
The second objective is to consider the adequacy of our framework for the 
discussion and measurement of economic security during times as tumultuous as the 
present. Since 2008, the global economy has fallen into recession and anxiety about the 
economic future has dramatically increased. In this context, how should one measure 
trends in economic security? Projections of the Index to 2010, computed on the basis of 
OECD unemployment forecasts, indicate that the global recession will lead to a 





Measuring Economic Security in Insecure 
Times: New Perspectives, New Events, and the 
Index of Economic Well-being 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i 
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... iii 
List of Charts..................................................................................................................... xii 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
II. The Index of Economic Well-being: Motivation and Framework ................................. 3 
III. The Evolution of the Economic Security Domain of the IEWB .................................. 5 
A. Security in the Event of Unemployment .................................................................... 6 
B. Security in the Event of Sickness ............................................................................. 10 
C. Security in the Event of Widowhood ....................................................................... 12 
D. Security in the Event of Old Age ............................................................................. 14 
E. Security in the event of disability or other loss of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond one‟s control ..................................................................................................... 16 
F. Aggregation of the Components of Economic Security into Overall Economic 
Security Domain Index  .................................................................................................. 17 
IV. Perennial Problems, Needed Revisions, and Possible Extensions ............................. 19 
A. Security in the Event of Unemployment .................................................................. 19 
B. Security in the Event of Sickness ............................................................................. 20 
C. Security in the Event of Old Age: Middle Class Security, Pension Adequacy and the 
Financial Melt-Down .................................................................................................... 21 
D. Security in the Event of Widowhood ....................................................................... 26 
V. Implications and Conclusions ...................................................................................... 26 
References ......................................................................................................................... 28 





Measuring Economic Security in Insecure 
Times: New Perspectives, New Events, and the 





Since 1998, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) has published 
the Index of Economic Well-Being (IEWB), which attempts to estimate the level and 
trend of aggregate economic well-being in Canada and other OECD nations. One of the 
four domains of economic well-being encompassed by the IEWB is the domain of 
economic security.  The economic security domain is important because a major issue in 
the 1998-2008 period was the policy drive in OECD nations toward greater “labour 
market flexibility,” a policy orientation under which labour market regulation and social 
policy were revised with the aim of reducing social protection in order to encourage 
economic growth.  The construction of the IEWB was motivated in part by the perception 
that both costs in reduced economic security and benefits in aggregate growth should be 
considered in any evaluation of trends in aggregate well-being.  The economic security 
domain is a major driver of the trends in the overall IEWB.  
 
This report has two main objectives. The first is to outline the development of the 
methodology for the measurement of economic security in the IEWB and to provide 
updated estimates of the Index of Economic Security over the period since 1980 for seven 
developed countries: Canada, Australia, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. These particular countries are especially interesting in 
the context of economic security because they epitomize the „Scandinavian‟, „Anglo‟ and 
„Continental European‟ welfare state regimes.   
 
The second objective is to consider the adequacy of our framework for discussion 
and measurement of economic (in)security during times as tumultuous as the present. 
Since 2008, the global economy has fallen into recession, unemployment has spiked 
upwards around the world, stock market values have tumbled (with an unprecedented 
amount of day to day volatility), and housing prices have declined in many countries. 
Anxiety about the economic future has dramatically increased. In this context, how 
should one measure recent trends in economic security? When business cycle changes are 
so rapid, how reliable are estimates based on historical data? What amendments to IEWB 
methodology should be made? How should one add the trend in economic security to the 
trends in average consumption, aggregate wealth and inequality to estimate what is 





The Index of Economic Well-being: Motivation and Framework 
 
Economic security is one domain within a broader conceptualization of economic 
well-being measured by the IEWB. The IEWB is calculated as a weighted sum of four 
dimensions of economic well-being:  
 
  average current consumption flows;  
  aggregate wealth accumulation for future consumption; 
  economic equality; and 
  economic security. 
 
 
This approach serves two purposes. First, it recognizes the multiplicity of 
dimensions of economic well-being. The four domains reflect economic well-being in 
both the present and the future, and account for both average access to economic 
resources and the distribution of that access among members of society.  In contrast, per-
capita GDP – perhaps the most commonly cited indicator of a society‟s average 
economic welfare – omits consideration of many issues (for example, leisure time, 
longevity of life, asset stock levels) that are important to individuals‟ command over 
resources. 
 
The second purpose of our approach is to allow for aggregation across dissimilar 
domains of well-being even in the presence of legitimate differences in values.  The 
IEWB is calculated as a weighted sum of the four domains, but different individuals may 
assign differing degrees of relative importance to each dimension of well-being; indeed, 
each citizen in a democratic society has the right to come to a personal conclusion about 
the relative weight of each dimension. Such differences notwithstanding, societies must 
make public policy choices and the members of a society are therefore, from time to time, 
faced with questions of the form: Would public policy X make „society‟ better off? Since 
some policies may favour one dimension of well-being over another, to answer this class 
of question citizens need a way of „adding it all up‟ – a way of coming to a summative 
judgment about impacts across the different, conceptually dissimilar domains of 
economic welfare.  One of the aims of index construction is therefore to facilitate public 
policy discussion by providing a transparent means of aggregating across different 
dimensions of well-being.  
 
When individuals disagree about a policy, it is useful to know whether the 
disagreement is rooted in different analyses of trends in objective economic data or in 
different subjective evaluations of the same objective trends. By making the value 
judgments regarding the weighting of the domains as transparent as possible, the IEWB 
aims to clarify the causes of disagreements about social trends and policy proposals.  
 
  In summary, the IEWB has two major aims: to aggregate across different 
dimensions of economic well-being, and to allow for such aggregation even in the 
presence of morally legitimate value differences.   Of course, there are many non-
economic aspects of human welfare.  In focusing on economic well-being, we do not v 
 
mean to downgrade the importance of non-economic factors.  Instead, we are motivated 
by the idea that a better measure of “access to resources needed for a decent standard of 
living” is needed if economic and social trends are to be combined into an index with 
larger ambitions. 
 
The Evolution of the Economic Security Domain 
 
The definition of „economic insecurity‟ that underlies our work is “the anxiety 
produced by a lack of economic safety – i.e. by an inability to obtain protection against 
subjectively significant potential economic losses.” Since this definition is essentially 
subjective, and forward-looking, the economic security domain is the most complex 
domain of the IEWB and the methodologies used in its construction have evolved since 
the Index was first released in 1998. 
 
Many types of hazards can be subject to uninsurable uncertainty. By what 
criterion should we select the specific hazards that span the „most important‟ life domains 
that cause economic insecurity? Over fifty years ago, the United Nations‟ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights stated: 
 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other loss of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.   [Article 25] 
 
The articulation and adoption of human rights covenants such as the UN‟s 
Universal Declaration are the result of a political process which (at least in democracies) 
can claim general societal support; no matter how wise they may be, individual 
researchers cannot claim such general social legitimacy. In constructing the Index of 
Economic Security, we therefore address the change over time in four key objective 
economic risks: those associated with unemployment, illness, “widowhood” (interpreted 
here as single female parenthood), and old age.  
 
Security in the event of unemployment 
 
Our measure of the risk imposed by unemployment is conceptually driven by 
three variables: the unemployment rate, the proportion of the unemployed receiving 
unemployment benefits, and the average proportion of earnings that are replaced by such 
benefits. However, since the OECD does not publish internationally comparable measure 
of the proportion of the unemployed who receive unemployment benefits, we must model 
“Security in the event of Unemployment” using just the unemployment rate and the 
average percentage of lost earnings replaced by unemployment benefits.  
 
Originally, the unemployment security component was based on an „expected 
value of financial loss‟ framework; the economic risk from unemployment was measured 
as the probability of becoming unemployed (proxied by the unemployment rate) vi 
 
multiplied by the fraction of wages not replaced by unemployment insurance benefits.  
This approach assumed that the state of being unemployed imposed no costs other than 
the lost earnings; or, in other words, the risk of unemployment was no more important 
than the generosity of the unemployment insurance system in determining the effect of 
unemployment on well-being. However, recent studies using data on self-reported 
happiness or life satisfaction have shown that the risk of unemployment imposes 
substantially greater disutility than the mere financial losses associated with 
unemployment. To account for these findings, we adjusted the methodology so that the 
risk of unemployment (as measured by the unemployment rate) receives a weight of four 
fifths, while the financial protection from unemployment receives a weight of only one 
fifth.  
 
Key findings pertaining to security from unemployment include: 
 
  In 2007, security from unemployment was highest in Norway, where the 
scaled value of unemployment security (measured on the [0,1] interval) 
was 0.808. Germany had the lowest score for security from the risk of 
unemployment, at 0.599.  
  Between 1980 and 2007, security from unemployment increased in four of 
the seven countries under analysis. The largest increase was in the United 
Kingdom, where the index of the unemployment security component 
increased from 0.336 to 0.671.    
  The new methodology, which weights the unemployment security 
component much more heavily than the financial protection from 
unemployment component, has a significant impact on the results. The 
more heavily the unemployment rate is weighted, the better the United 
States looks during periods (as in the 1990s) when the US unemployment 
rate was low compared to other nations. The United States‟ score is 0.693 
under the new methodology, well above its score of 0.528 under the 
original methodology. 
 
Security in the event of illness 
 
   In keeping with our economic focus – interpreting „economic‟ as control over 
material goods and services – we make no attempt to quantify the utility loss from pain or 
suffering or capacity limitation imposed by illness. The focus of the IEWB is the 
financial risk imposed by illness. In principle, this has three dimensions: (a) expenditures 
on care necessitated by illness; (b) the loss of income caused by illness and (c) the 
possibility of events such as personal bankruptcy that might be precipitated by illness. 
 
In international comparisons, the key issue is the coverage of public health care. 
In Canada and in all other developed countries except for the United States, health care 
deemed medically necessary and provided by hospitals and doctors‟ offices is free of 
charge to all citizens, because it is provided through publicly financed medicare 
programs. In this sense, the financial risk imposed by illness is much less than in 
countries without such universal coverage. vii 
 
 
Nevertheless, private expenditures on health care are significant and have been 
rising rapidly even in Canada. In the IEWB, we use the percentage of disposable 
household income spent by households on health care services that is not reimbursed by 
public or private health insurance as our indicator of the financial risk arising from 
illness. In principle, we would like to distinguish between the private expenditures 
produced by the hazard of illness and those resulting from consumer preferences. As a 
practical matter, however, statistics collected from the providers of medical services 
typically report the aggregate total of both types of spending.  
 
Empirical results on security from the financial risk of illness include the 
following: 
 
  In 2007, private health care expenditures as a share of disposable income 
were lowest in the United Kingdom, at 1.2 per cent. They were highest in 
the United States, at 9.7 per cent.  
  Among the seven OECD countries analyzed in this report, the United 
States is a clear outlier in terms of security from the risk of illness. The 
index of the security from illness component declined from 0.452 in 1980 
to 0.083 in 2007. Among the other countries, the index never fell lower 
than 0.661 (Australia in 1982).  
 
Security in the event of widowhood 
 
In all countries discussed in this report, the prevalence of poverty among single 
parent families is much higher than in the general population, and family break-up is a 
hugely important determinant of entry into poverty. We model trends in this aspect of 
economic insecurity in an „expected value‟ sense – i.e. we multiply (the probability of 
divorce) * (the poverty rate among single female parent families) * (the average poverty 
gap ratio among single female parent families).  The product of these last two variables is 
proportional to the intensity of poverty. Poverty is defined in relative terms as the 
proportion of households below one half median equivalent income. 
 
Key empirical results include: 
 
  In 2007, the divorce rate per thousand ranged from 2.2 in Canada and 
Sweden to 4.2 in the United States. The divorce rates serve as estimates of 
the probability of family break-up. 
  The United States was also an outlier in the poverty gap for single parent 
families at 42.7 per cent in 2007, compared to a range for other nations 
from 18.8 per cent in the United Kingdom to 32.3 per cent in Germany. 
  Canada (43.4 per cent) and the United States (43.7 per cent) were similar 
in the rate of poverty for single female headed households with children in 
2007 – well above Germany (34.9 per cent), the United Kingdom (30.5 
per cent) or Australia (31.6 per cent) and very different from Norway and viii 
 
Sweden, where the poverty rate was 13.3 per cent and 9.7 per cent 
respectively. 
  The United States is by far the least secure nation in terms of security from 
the risk of single-parent poverty. Its score on the index for this component 
increased from 0.164 in 1980 to 0.333 in 2007; among the other countries, 
the index never fell below 0.566 (Canada in 1980).    
 
Security in the event of old age 
 
The IEWB interpretation of „security in the event of old age‟ is security from the 
risk of poverty in old age. This is proxied by the poverty intensity (poverty rate * average 
poverty gap ratio) experienced by households headed by persons 65 and over.  
 
Empirical findings include: 
 
  In 2007, security from old-age poverty was highest in Norway, Sweden, 
and Canada, with index scores of 0.837, 0.835, and 0.827, respectively. 
The United States‟ score of 0.266 was lowest among the countries.  
  Canada experiences the largest increase in security from poverty in old 
age over the period; it grew 54.3 per cent from 0.536 in 1980 to 0.827 in 
2007. Security from old-age poverty also increased in Germany, Norway 
and the United States.   
  Security from poverty in old age fluctuated over the 1980-2007 period in 
all countries. In Germany, Norway and Sweden, it followed a „saw-tooth‟ 
pattern, falling precipitously and then rising back to its original level 
within the space of a few years.  This may reflect a large number of 
elderly persons whose only income is from public pension systems and 
who temporarily fall below the poverty line when the public pension 
systems are not perfectly adjusted for annual inflation. 
 
Aggregation of the components into the Index of Economic Security 
 
   The Index of Economic Security is a weighted sum of the scaled values of the 
four components discussed above: security from unemployment, illness, single-parent 
poverty, and poverty in old age. The weights are based on the relative sizes of the 
populations deemed to be subject to each risk. Those populations are: 
   
  Unemployment risk – the population of working age (15-64 years). In 
Canada, this was about 68 per cent of the total population in 2007. 
  Risk of illness – the total population (100 per cent). 
  Risk of single-parent poverty – the population of married women and their 
children under age 18. In Canada, this was 33 per cent of the total 
population in 2007. 
  Risk of old-age poverty – the population approaching old age (45-64 
years). In Canada, this was 27 per cent of the population in 2007.  
 ix 
 
The weights are generated by adding up all the proportions of the population 
subject to the four risks (68+100+33+27=228 in the Canadian case in 2007) and then 
dividing each population proportion by that total. In Canada in 2007, the weights for the 
four components of economic security were 0.146 for security from single-parent 
poverty; 0.117 for security from poverty in old age; 0.438 for security from the financial 
risk of illness; and 0.298 for security from unemployment. 
 
  Key empirical results for the overall Index of Economic Security are: 
 
  Norway had the highest score on the Index in 2007, at 0.835, followed by 
Sweden at 0.781 and the United Kingdom at 0.780. Canada ranked fifth 
among the seven countries, but the index scores for Australia, Canada and 
Germany (ranked fourth to sixth) were nearly identical. 
  The United States had the lowest economic security score by far, at 0.319. 
Among the other countries, the Index never fell below 0.598 (Australia in 
1993).  
  In addition, economic security declined in the United States over the 
1980-2007 period. It fell 33.9 per cent, from 0.427 to 0.319.  No other 
country experienced as large a proportional decline in its economic 
security score over the period.  
  Economic security increased in Australia, Canada, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom over the 1980-2007 period. The increases were small, 
however.  
 
Perennial Problems, Needed Revisions, and Possible Extensions 
 
Security in the event of unemployment 
 
The rapidity of the onset of the current global recession since late 2008 has been 
unprecedented.  If we continued to use only observed data, publication of an index based 
on such data would risk irrelevance to current social realities, since annual data on a 
cross-section of countries is still only available up to 2007 because of lags in data 
availability. It is plausible to think that the insecurities felt in 2009 are quite different 
from those of 2007 – but the key issue is how much they might have changed. 
 
The big change that a recession produces is in expectations of the unemployment 
rate. The OECD Interim Economic Outlook of March 2009 predicted that Canadian 
unemployment would rise from 6.1 per cent in 2008 to 8.8 per cent in 2009 and 10.5 per 
cent in 2010. Indeed, the unemployment rate is projected to increase across the OECD 
throughout 2009 and 2010. This will lead to substantial decreases in security from 
unemployment in all countries. The index of the security from unemployment component 
is projected to decline by between 14.4 per cent (in Germany) and 24.6 per cent (in the 




Security in the event of illness 
 
 Three issues have been questioned as problematic in our index of security in the 
event of illness:  
 
  our inability to make any allowance for the risk of uninsured earnings 
losses produced by sickness;  
  the difficulty of distinguishing between optional choices and medical 
necessities as components of uninsured medical expenditures; and  
  the possibility that our index understates the qualitative differences 
between health care coverage systems, particularly the difference in risk of 
medically induced personal bankruptcy between the United States and 
other countries.  
 
We have no estimates of the coverage of individuals against the hazard of loss of 
earnings in the event of illness. We have long known this to be a deficiency of the IEWB, 
and the derivation of such estimates is an area for future research. 
 
  If the income elasticity of demand for discretionary health expenditures is similar 
across countries and if the insurance coverage of discretionary, medically unnecessary 
expenses is comparable, a simple model can be used to illustrate the irrelevance of 
discretionary expenditure to our rankings of countries. See Appendix 1 of this report.  
 
  In the United States, the possibility of disastrously large health care bills (which 
may exceed coverage limits even for individuals with some health insurance) is a worst 
case outcome that has no real parallel in Canada or other countries with an effective 
public health care system. However, the United States is a clear outlier in terms of 
security from illness even under our current methodology. Further, we can show (again, 
using the model in Appendix 1) that there is a monotonic relationship between the 
average uncovered health care cost burden and the probability of health care cost 
bankruptcy. Thus, it is not clear that our current methodology fails to capture the relevant 
information with respect to the United States‟ poor performance in security from the risk 
of illness.  
 
Security in the event of old age 
 
   The IEWB addresses the issue of old-age poverty, but another relevant risk 
associated with old age – especially during a severe economic downturn – is the risk that 
private retirement savings may not deliver the expected standard of living after 
retirement. As financial markets deteriorated during 2008, the real return on pension fund 
assets was -23.9 per cent in Canada and -25.8 per cent in the United States. In addition, 
precipitous declines in stock values and housing prices eliminated a large amount of 
wealth that elderly or near-elderly persons thought they had accumulated.  
 
  From the perspective of security in the event of old age, the exposure of 
individuals to these trends in asset prices depends on the extent to which they have such xi 
 
assets, whether they are contractually protected, and the current credibility of such 
contract protections. A comprehensive accounting of personal wealth should include both 
the private assets of individuals and the present value of their expected benefits from 
public pensions, and the level of security in old age of people at different points in the 
income distribution depends on the details of the structure of their nations‟ old age 
security systems. These details differ substantially across countries.  
 
  The issue of pension adequacy for life-style maintenance is complex, problematic 
to summarize and difficult to observe in longitudinal data sets in a given country, much 
less in internationally comparable longitudinal data. By contrast, the focus of the IEWB 
on whether or not elderly people are income poor in old age relies on a relatively 
straightforward measurement. 
 
Security in the event of widowhood 
 
The IEWB ignores the poverty probability of male single parents. Is it fair to 
argue that the IEWB embodies an anti-male gender bias?  
 
The economic equality component of the IEWB counts the poverty rate and 
poverty gap of all household types. Impoverished single-parent families headed by males 
are therefore included in the IEWB through the equality domain.  
 
In the economic security domain, we are concerned with insecurity in the sense of 
“the anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety.” We think that males and females 
feel this anxiety quite differently, for both objective and cultural reasons. Although some 
men may fear the prospect of poverty due to desertion by their wives, we think it is only 




The economic security component of the IEWB can be easily extended, using forecasts of 
the unemployment rate, to model the change in economic security induced by a 
recessionary downturn in the labour market. However, our Index of Economic Security 
has emphasized security against the risk of poverty, and the IEWB should be interpreted 
in that light. The peculiar nature of the current recession has also raised the question as to 
whether a broader and more complex measure of „economic security‟ among the non-
poor also deserves some consideration. xii 
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Since 1998, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards has published the Index 
of Economic Well-Being, which attempts to estimate the level and trend of aggregate 
economic well-being in Canada and other OECD nations (Osberg and Sharpe, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2009a, 2009b). One of the four components of the IEWB, and a key driver of 
its trends during the 1990s, is the sub-index of Economic Security. A major issue of the 
1998-2008 period was the policy drive in OECD nations to greater “labour market 
flexibility”, a policy direction which produced revisions to labour market regulation and 
social policy aimed at reducing social protection in order to encourage growth.  The 
construction of the IEWB was motivated in part by the perception that both costs in 
reduced economic security and benefits in aggregate growth should be considered in any 
evaluation of trends in aggregate well-being. However, during this period, policy changes 
were usually gradual. It was consequently not a major constraint that in measuring the 
impact of changes in economic security on economic well-being, data on macro-
economic aggregates and micro-data on individual households are available only with a 
lag, often of several years. At least until recently, the extrapolation of past trends 
provided a plausible guide to current realities, and to likely future outcomes.  
 
Recently, this assumption has become more questionable. Since late  2008, the 
global economy has sunk into recession, unemployment has spiked upwards around the 
world, North American stock market values have tumbled per cent, (with an 
unprecedented amount of day to day volatility) and housing prices have declined in many 
countries. With news reports of major corporate bankruptcies filling the daily headlines, 
and continual downward revisions of economic growth projections from major agencies 
such as the IMF and OECD, uncertainty about the future has surged. It is not clear 
whether Canada and other OECD nations are entering a long period of continued 
financial instability and slow or negative growth or whether „business as usual‟ will re-
emerge in short order. But it is clear that confidence in financial markets has been badly 
shaken, that several trillion dollars of perceived wealth in home equity and stock market 
value has vaporized and that anxiety about the economic future has dramatically 
increased. 
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The sudden onset of the global recession, and the particular combination of 
financial crisis and real economy decline that has characterized this recession, pose 
significant problems for the measurement of economic security, and its implications for 
aggregate well-being. How should one measure recent trends in the economic security 
that individuals need to plan their personal visions of the future good life? When business 
cycle changes are so rapid, how reliable can estimates based on historical data be? What 
amendments to IEWB methodology should be made? How should one add the trend in 
economic security to the trends in average consumption, aggregate wealth and inequality 
to estimate what is happening to over-all economic well-being?  
 
  Although estimates of the IEWB are available for fourteen OECD countries 
(Osberg and Sharpe, 2009a), this report is restricted to Canada, Australia, Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States and to analysis of trends 
since 1980. We focus on these seven nations for three reasons. First, simultaneous 
discussion of too many places rapidly becomes unmanageable. Second, these particular 
countries may be especially interesting because they epitomize the „Scandinavian‟, 
„Anglo‟ and „Continental European‟ welfare state regimes. Third, an earlier paper 
(Osberg and Sharpe, 2005) has already discussed, for these countries, the implications of 
the IEWB for the Human Development Index.  
 
The report starts in Section 2 with a brief outline of the Index of Economic Well-
Being, in which a measure of economic security is embedded. Section 3 then discusses 
our methodology for the measurement of Economic Security, the amendments that have 
been made over the years and the rationale for these changes. Section 3 also presents 
updated estimates, which combine actual data to 2007 and OECD forecasts of 
unemployment through 2010. Section 4 then considers the adequacy of our framework 
for discussion and measurement of economic (in)security during times as tumultuous as 
the present. Section 5 discusses possible improvements for the future. 3 
 




The IEWB is an intermediate type of index. While broader in conception than 
GDP per capita, it still aims only at the „economic‟ dimension of life – its philosophy is 
that there is more to “well-being” than economic well-being, but there is more to 
economic well-being than GDP per capita, and it is useful to have better measures of the 
economic well-being of society because better measurement may help guide better 
decisions. The IEWB avoids consideration of broader „quality of life‟ issues (such as 
crime rates) on the grounds that too much aggregation of dissimilar dimensions of social 
and political well-being can obscure understanding of their inter-relationships. But it takes 
a broad view of “economic well-being” as being “access to the resources needed for 
material consumption” because the narrower focus of GDP accounting omits 
consideration of many issues (for example, leisure time, longevity of life, asset stock 
levels) which are important to the command over resources of individuals. Our Index of 
Economic Well-Being is based on four dimensions of economic well-being – average 
current consumption flows, aggregate accumulation for future consumption, income 
distribution, and economic security. 
 
Exhibit 1 illustrates our identification of four components of well being, which 
recognize trends in both average outcomes and in the diversity of outcomes, both now 
and in the future. 
 
Exhibit 1: Dimensions of Economic Well-being 
Concept  Present  Future 
"Typical Citizen" or 
"Representative Agent" 
[A] 
Average flow of current 
income 
[B] 
Aggregate accumulation of 
productive stocks 
Heterogeneity of Experiences 
of All Citizens 
[C] 
Distribution of potential 
consumption -- income 
inequality and poverty 
[D] 
Insecurity of future incomes 
 
 
When an average income flow concept like GDP per capita is used as a summative 
index of society‟s well-being, the analyst is implicitly stopping in quadrant [A] – 
assuming (a) that the experience of a representative agent can summarize the well-being 
of society and (b) that the measured income flow optimally weights consumption and 
savings, so that one need not explicitly distinguish between present consumption flows 
and the accumulation of asset stocks which will enable future consumption flows. 
However, if society is composed of diverse individuals living in an uncertain world who 
typically “live in the present, anticipating the future,” each individual‟s estimate of 
societal economic well-being will depend on the proportion of national income saved for 
                                                 
2 This section is largely based on Osberg and Sharpe (2005).  4 
 
the future – i.e. both quadrants [A] and [B] matter. As well, real societies are not equal. 
There is therefore a long tradition in economics that “social welfare” depends on both 
average incomes and the degree of inequality and poverty in the distribution of incomes – 
quadrant [C]. And the focus of this paper is on quadrant [D] – the fact that if the future is 
uncertain, and complete insurance is unobtainable (either privately or through the welfare 
state), individuals will also care about the degree to which the economic future is secure.  
 
These four components therefore have a logical rationale and a manageable 
dimensionality – the IEWB is calculated as the weighted sum of [A] + [B] + [C] + [D]. 
However, although these four dimensions of well-being are all valuable to some degree, 
tastes differ. Different individuals may assign differing degrees of relative importance to 
each dimension of well-being – indeed, each citizen in a democratic society has the right 
to come to a personal conclusion about the relative weight of each dimension.  And 
because citizens are occasionally called upon, in a democracy, to exercise choices (e.g. in 
voting) on issues that affect the collectivity (and some individuals, such as civil servants, 
make such decisions on a daily basis), they all have reason sometimes to ask questions of 
the form: “Would public policy X make „society‟ better off?” 
 
A measure of social well-being is useful if some people, at least some of the time, 
want an index to help them answer such questions. We can assume that individuals know 
more about their own preferences and their own life situation than anyone else is likely to 
know, so individuals need no real help in calculating the implications for their own 
personal utility of public policy on any given issue. But individuals who want to 
maximize some combination of their own well-being and society‟s well-being, can be 
seen as maximizing: Ui =  1 (own utility) +  2 (Social Index expressing own estimate of 
society‟s well-being). If  2  = 0 for all persons, always, then there is no point in 
constructing the IEWB or any other social index. We are presuming that for some people, 
at least some of the time,  2  ≠ 0 – which we think to be highly plausible. 
 
In the real world, citizens are frequently called upon to choose between policies 
(e.g. on education, or on health) which affect dimensions of life that cannot be measured 
in directly comparable units. Hence, individuals often have to come to a summative 
decision – i.e. have a way of “adding it all up” – across domains that are conceptually 
dissimilar. We argue that the role of people who construct social indices should be one of 
helping citizens – e.g. as voters in elections and as bureaucrats in policy making – to 
come to reasonable summative decisions about the level of society`s well-being. From 
this perspective, the purpose of index construction should be to help individuals think 
systematically about public policy, without necessarily presuming that all individuals 
have the same values. Although it may not be possible to define an objective index of 
societal well-being, individuals still have the problem (indeed, the moral responsibility) 
of coming to a subjective evaluation of social states, and they need organized, objective 
data if they are to do it in a reasonable way. 
 
    Each dimension of economic well-being is itself an aggregation of many 
underlying trends, on which the existing data is of variable quality – the subject of this 
paper is the “Economic Security” domain. 5 
 
III. The Evolution of the Economic Security Domain of the 
IEWB 
 
The definition of „economic insecurity‟ that underlies our work has been: “the 
anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety – i.e. by an inability to obtain protection 
against subjectively significant potential economic losses” (Osberg, 1998:17).  An 
alternative definition is “an individual‟s perception of the risk of economic misfortune” 
(Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Scheve-Slaughter, 2004, Anderson and Gascon; 2007). 
Since both definitions are essentially subjective, and forward-looking, the „economic 
security‟ domain is the most complex domain of the Index of Economic Well-being and 
the methodologies used in its construction have evolved since the Index was first released 
in 1998. 
 
Uninsurable uncertainty about what the future holds will decrease the economic 
welfare of risk averse individuals, but many types of hazards can be subject to 
uninsurable uncertainty. To construct a useful index, we must specify both the types of 
misfortune that might produce insecurity and the measures of anxiety or insecurity about 
such losses.  But what is the criterion for selecting the specific hazards that span the 
„most important‟ life domains that cause economic insecurity, and for neglecting others?  
 
   Over fifty years ago, the United Nations‟ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
stated: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old 




Because the articulation, and adoption, of human rights covenants such as the 
UN‟s Universal Declaration are the result of a political process which (at least in 
democracies) can claim general societal support, these documents have huge 
advantages in specifying the important aspects of well-being to consider in index 
construction. No matter how wise they may be, individual researchers cannot claim 
such general social legitimacy. In this and other papers we have therefore adopted a 
“named risks” approach, and addressed the change over time in four key objective 
economic risks – those associated with unemployment, illness, “widowhood” 
(interpreted here as single female parenthood) and old age.
4 Our core hypothesis is 
                                                 
3Today, the gender specificity of the language of 1948 will strike many people as odd – but Article 2 makes 
it clear that all rights are to be guaranteed to male and female persons equally.
 
4 The required data have not been available to measure the economic misfortunes associated with disability, 
but were that possible, we would include it as well. 6 
 
that changes in the subjective level of anxiety about a lack of economic safety are 
proportionate to changes in objective risk.
5 
 
  We adopt this empirical strategy partly because reliable survey data on 
subjective anxieties or economic security are only occasionally available. 
Nevertheless, even if we use objective data to predict subjective attitudes, measuring 
the objective risks of “the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old 
age or other loss of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” is an exercise in 
empirical compromise. Comparisons over time and space are only possible if 
comparable data has been gathered at different times and places, which inevitably 
restricts our measurement choices to pre-existing data bases. Since there is less data 
available that is comparable internationally than there is available within Canada, we 
have had to accept some compromises in international comparisons which we can 
avoid in interprovincial, or over time, comparisons within Canada. 
 
A. Security in the Event of Unemployment 
 
Our measure of the risk imposed by unemployment is conceptually driven by 
three variables: the unemployment rate, the proportion of the unemployed receiving 
unemployment benefits, and the average proportion of earnings that are replaced by such 
benefits. However, an important limitation of our international comparisons is the fact 
that although the OECD does publish internationally comparable measures of the average 
replacement rate, we do not have a reliably comparable measure of the proportion of the 
unemployed who receive unemployment benefits. In this paper, we must therefore model 
“Security in the event of Unemployment” using just the unemployment rate and the 
average percentage of lost earnings replaced by unemployment benefits (i.e. the “Gross 
Replacement Rate”).
6 (Our comparisons of different provinces within Canada are not 
constrained in this way.) 
 
For Canadian readers, this limitation of the current paper is especially important. 
In the first version of the IEWB (Osberg and Sharpe, 1998), the large downward trend in 
the „security from unemployment‟ component was an important driver of the overall 
economic security domain and hence the overall Index. Within the risk to unemployment 
component it was the fall in the EI coverage rate (the ratio of EI beneficiaries to 
unemployed) that was in turn driving the risk of unemployment component – and the 
decline in UI/EI coverage is a crucial aspect of the inadequacy of Canada‟s current EI 
system to meet the needs of Canadians for economic security in the current recession 
(Osberg, 2009a). When we use Canadian data to compare jurisdictions within Canada, or 
trends over time, we are able to account for this trend – which is why our within-Canada 
and cross-national comparisons do not have quite the same trends. 
                                                 
5 In three waves of International Social Survey Programme data (1989, 1997 and 2005), Green (2009:1) 
reports that “subjective employment insecurity tracks the unemployment rate,” while Dominitz and Manski 
(1997) report that “Expectations and realizations of health insurance coverage and of job loss tend to match 
up closely” for the United States. 
6 We use the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels and three 
family situations. Source: See Martin (1996) for a fuller discussion.  7 
 
 
Originally, the conceptual framework underlying the unemployment security 
component was the expected value of financial loss. The economic risk created by 
unemployment was seen as a compound probability of financial loss for the “typical” 
labour force participant – i.e. (probability of not having a job) * (fraction of wage not 
replaced by UI/EI).
7 This probabilistic approach ignored any non-economic costs to non-
employment, and implicitly assumed it was irrelevant which component of the compound 
probability of financial loss changed – all that mattered was the “bottom line” of financial 
loss due to unemployment.
8  
 
Since the publication of our initial estimates of the Index of Economic Well-
being, the economics literature has seen a spectacular growth in the number of papers 
using self-reported measures of happiness, life satisfaction or well-being. A consistent 
finding in this literature is the large negative impact on happiness of higher 
unemployment rates – not just for those actually unemployed, but also for the employed 
who become more anxious about the risk of unemployment (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Di 
Tella and MacCulloch, 2003). In some specifications of the correlates of individual 
happiness, one can compare directly the relative magnitude of the influence on happiness 
of changes in the risk of unemployment and changes in unemployment compensation 
benefits – and the hypothesis that these are equal in impact is conclusively rejected. 
Cross-country regressions with life satisfaction data on 271 thousand people indicate that 
the unemployment rate is considerably more important than the unemployment 
compensation system as a source of self-reported happiness for the working population.
9 
Consequently, in the aggregation of the overall employment security index it is now 
given a weight of four-fifths, compared to a weight of one-fifth for the financial 
protection variable – which represents a significant change from the earlier methodology 
where the unemployment rate and unemployment benefit system were weighted equally.  
 
The aggregation procedure for the variables that make up the risk of 
unemployment component of the economic security domain recognizes two distinct 
issues – the risk of unemployment and the risk of financial loss from unemployment. 
Both the unemployment rate and the financial protection index are scaled, using the linear 
scaling procedure (Sharpe and Salzman, 2003). The scaled values of the two indexes are 
weighted to produce the overall index of security from the risk imposed by 
                                                 
7 In analyses using just Canadian data, we were able to use: (probability of not having a job) * (probability 
of not getting UI/EI benefits) * (fraction of wage not replaced by UI/EI). As a practical matter, this 
methodology meant that much of the change during the 1990s in the overall risk to unemployment variable 
came from the large fall in the UI/EI coverage rate over this period. See Osberg and Sharpe (2009b). 
8 The view that the only costs associated with unemployment are monetary has been strongly criticized – 
e.g. by Osberg (1988). 
9 See Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003:819), where in six different specifications of ordered probit 
regressions (n=271,224) predicting life satisfaction, the size of the negative coefficient on the 
unemployment rate was, on average, 2.13 times larger than the size of the positive coefficient on 
unemployment benefits. Since the range of unemployment benefits observed (0.003 to 0.631) was about 
three times greater than the range of unemployment rates (0.006 to 0.211), one should rescale regression 
coefficients to a common range to interpret relative size effects – hence their results could be read as 
implying unemployment changes are about six times more important than UI benefit changes in 
maintaining well-being. 8 
 
unemployment. The relative ease of obtaining a job provides employment security by 
enabling attractive options (in a low unemployment labour market) in the event of 
unemployment. A higher probability of obtaining unemployment benefits, or higher 
benefits, provides security by compensating individuals for their earnings loss. We make 
the unemployment rate and the financial protection rate additive in weighted impacts, not 
multiplicative, which dampens the evolution of the risk to unemployment component 
over time. 
 
  Chart 1 presents estimates of our Security from Unemployment sub-index for 
Canada, Australia, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, for the period 1980-2007. For four countries – Canada, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States – we also use OECD forecasts to produce projections of 
the index through 2010 using our updated methodology. Chart 2 is a sensitivity analysis 
that shows – for the illustrative cases of the United States and Canada – what the trend 
would have been if the unemployment and financial protection variables were weighted 
as in our original methodology. As one might expect, the more heavily the 
unemployment rate is weighted, the better the United States tends look during periods (as 
in the 1990s) when the US unemployment rate was low compared to other nations. Chart 
3 summarizes the beginning and end dates.  
 
 




























































































Chart 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Security from Unemployment, Canada and the 
United States, 1980-2010 
 




























































































United States (New Weighting)
United States (Equal Weighting)
Note: New weighting is 0.8 unemployment + 0.2 replacement rate. 






























Note: Computed using the new weighting (0.8 unemployment + 0.2 replacement rate).
* Estimates for 2010 are based on unemployment projections from OECD (2009b).10 
 
B. Security in the Event of Sickness 
 
In keeping with our economic focus – interpreting „economic‟ as control over 
material goods and services – we make no attempt to quantify the utility loss from pain or 
suffering or capacity limitation imposed by illness. The focus of the IEWB is the 
financial risk imposed by illness, which has three dimensions: (a) expenditures on care 
necessitated by illness; (b) the loss of income caused by illness and (c) the possibility of 
events such as personal bankruptcy that might be precipitated by illness.  
 
In international comparisons, a key issue is the coverage of public health care. In 
Canada and in all other developed countries except for the United States, health care 
deemed medically necessary and provided by hospitals and doctors‟ offices is free of 
charge to all citizens, because it is provided through publicly financed medicare 
programs. In this sense, the financial risk imposed by illness is much less than in 
countries without such universal coverage. The United States is the only country in our 
sample that is in the latter category.
10 Other countries have different mixes of public and 
private services, with varying combinations of co-pay for services rendered.  Even in 
Canada there are significant private expenditures on health care, which have been rising 
rapidly – for example, dental care, many drugs taken outside hospitals, unlisted medical 
services such as acupuncture, and delisted medical services (physiotherapy and vision 
care are examples of medical services that have been recently delisted in Ontario – but in 
general the coverage of drugs and non-standard services varies by province).  
 
In principle, we would like to distinguish between the private expenditures 
produced by the hazard of illness and those resulting from consumer preferences – but as 
a practical matter, statistics collected from the providers of medical services typically 
report the aggregate total of both types of spending. Plastic surgeons will, for example, 
both repair the disfiguring damage caused by fires and accidents and indulge the 
preferences of those individuals sufficiently affluent to purchase a slightly altered shape 
of nose. If our objective is to assess individuals‟ “Security in the event of sickness,” we 
would like to assess the protection individuals have against the costs of the former event, 
while disregarding expenditures resulting from the latter choice. Conceptually, one has 
„security‟ if one can obtain protection from the adverse implications of an event that is ex 




In the Canadian context, a plastic surgeon should in principle be reimbursed by 
the public health care system for providing „medically necessary‟ procedures, but not for 
indulging discretionary consumer choices – but there is continual controversy over the 
                                                 
10 The lack of universal public health care makes the United States an outlier among developed countries, 
but it is worth remembering that most of the world‟s population is not covered by universal health care. 
Further, some (such as citizens of China) have lost whatever universality they once enjoyed. From this 
perspective, the financial risk from illness is very relevant to the economic security of most of the people 
on the earth. 
11 We disregard here any change in probability of adverse events that might be induced by choice – e.g. we 
would consider fixing a broken leg to be a medically necessary procedure, however it happened and 
whether or not the choice to go skiing changes its probability.  11 
 
conceptual dividing line between the two categories and over the extent to which 
inadequate or delayed supply of medically necessary public health care services is driving 
the purchase of private substitutes. As well, an institutional feature of the Canadian 
system is the fact that medically necessary drugs are provided free by the state in a 
hospital context, but not after discharge from hospital (although the cost may then be 
wholly or partially covered by private insurance or by provincial drug assistance plans – 
e.g. for the elderly or low-income populations). Both the speed of patient discharge and 
the reliance of the health care system on drug therapies has been rising over time. If one 
adds together the wholly covered costs of hospital care and the partially covered costs of 
drug treatment, the result is a partially covered system of paying for medically necessary 
health care costs. 
 
In the IEWB, we have used the percentage of disposable household income spent 
by households on health care services that is not reimbursed by public or private health 
insurance as our indicator of the financial risk raised by illness. In 2007, this ranged from 
a low of 1.2 per cent in the United Kingdom to a high of 9.7 per cent in the United States, 
with Canada the next highest at 3.6 per cent. Per capita private expenditure on health care 
in Canada rose from $353 (US$ -2000 prices) in 1980 to $964 in 2007. Although this 
development can be considered a deterioration over time in the economic security of 
Canadians, Chart 4 and Chart 5 illustrate how Canada and these other five affluent OECD 
countries are clustered in a fairly narrow band. The charts also illustrate the much lower 
level of, and larger deterioration in, security in the event of illness in the United States, 
relative to other countries 
 
  













































































































































United States 12 
 




C. Security in the Event of Widowhood 
 
    When the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in 1948, the 
percentage of single parent families was relatively high in many countries, partly as a 
result of the casualties of World War II.  At that point in time, the “male bread-winner 
model” of a single earner household with a non-employed spouse was a plausible 
portrayal of social reality and “widowhood” was the primary way in which women and 
children lost access to male earnings.  Since then, the two-earner family has become the 
social norm in all the countries discussed in this paper, while divorce and separation have 
become the primary origins of single parent families.  However, it remains true that many 
women and children are “one man away from poverty.” 
 
    In all countries discussed in this paper, the prevalence of poverty among single 
parent families is much higher than in the general population, and family break-up is a 
hugely important determinant of entry into poverty.  Although we recognize that divorce 
and separation have large emotional costs for many people and that the termination of 
abusive or dysfunctional relationships can have social benefits, we do not attempt to 
model these issues. We also do not attempt to model the transactions costs – e.g. in legal 
bills – associated with the risk of family breakup. Our focus is a limited financial one – 
i.e. we model the risk of becoming poor because of family breakup.  
 
    We model trends in this aspect of economic insecurity in an „expected value‟ 






























12 * (the average poverty gap ratio among single female parent 
families).
13  The product of these last two variables is proportional to the intensity of 
poverty. Poverty is defined as it was for all households under the equality domain – in 
relative terms as the proportion of households below one half median equivalent income. 
 
    The divorce rate per thousand was 2.2 in Canada in 2007, the same as Sweden 
and not so different from Germany or Norway (2.3), but less than Australia (2.6), the 
United Kingdom (2.8) and the United States (4.2). The United States was also an outlier 
in the poverty gap for single parent families at 42.7 per cent, compared to a range for 
other nations from 18.8 per cent in the United Kingdom to 32.3 per cent in Germany. 
However, Canada (43.4 per cent) and the United States (43.7 per cent) were quite similar 
in the rate of poverty for single female headed households with children – well above 
Germany (34.9 per cent), the United Kingdom (30.5 per cent) or Australia (31.6 per cent) 
and very different from Norway and Sweden, where the poverty rate was 13.3 per cent 
and 9.7 per cent respectively.  
 
   





                                                 
12 Since RATE= INCIDENCE x AVERAGE DURATION, the poverty rate among single parents is equal 
to the conditional probability that a single parent will enter poverty multiplied by the average duration of a 
poverty spell, we are accounting  jointly for the duration of poverty spells and for their likelihood, but with 
the restrictive maintained hypothesis that both have equal influence.  Inadequacy of data preclude 
examination of household dissolution among co-habiting couples. 
13 This procedure effectively ignores single male parents. In Canada, males comprise only about 17 per cent 
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With the United States as an outlier on all dimensions, but other countries 
sometimes higher and sometimes lower on particular dimensions, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Chart 6 and Chart 7 show the product of these influences to be clustered in 
a fairly narrow band – except for the United States. 
 
D. Security in the Event of Old Age 
 
The IEWB perspective on security in the event of old age has been that feelings of 
insecurity about old age are often driven by fears of a worst case outcome, and the 
likelihood of that worst case outcome. For that reason, the fourth component of the 
economic security domain is the risk of poverty in old age, which is proxied by the 
poverty intensity (= poverty rate * average poverty gap ratio) experienced by households 
headed by a person 65 and over.   
 
  Chart 8 indicates fluctuations over time in poverty intensity among senior citizens 
– e.g. in Germany or Norway – which sometimes seem to follow a “saw-tooth‟ type of 
pattern. A possible explanation is that a characteristic feature of the income distribution 
of the elderly in all the countries discussed in this article is a “spike” in the incomes of 
the elderly at the minimum income base defined by the structure of the country‟s old age 
security system, which is often quite close to the „one half median income‟ poverty line. 
Since the elderly are, in the main, not employed, and many depend entirely on public 
pensions, their incomes from pension entitlements can often be much the same, because 
they are determined by the same formula, and driven by much the same data. The large 
number of elderly people without significant income from capital or private pensions 
necessarily have to depend entirely on the minimum income base defined by pension 
legislation. When the resulting spike in the income distribution is close to the poverty 





























Chart 8: Trends in Security from Poverty in Old Age, Selected OECD Countries, 
1980-2007 
 
   
 
years, one will tend to observe „saw-tooth‟ fluctuations over time in poverty among the 
elderly. As well, since our data for this variable are drawn from the Luxembourg Income 
Study, which has periodic observations from each country, we have been forced to 
interpolate between data points and accept data (e.g. from Germany in 1983 and 1984) 
which are drawn from different original surveys – and both these compromises may 
introduce error. 
 
As both Chart 8 and Chart 9 show, security in old age improved significantly in 
Canada over the 1980 to 2007 period. For most other countries, despite some significant 
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E. Security in the event of disability or other loss of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond one’s control 
 
“Disability” is a term that covers a number of specific hazards, for which some 
insurance coverage is available. In Canada, workers compensation provides partial 
coverage to covered employees and some workers are covered under private “long-term 
disability” insurance policies held by their employers. Short-term illness benefits are 
available under Employment Insurance and longer-term benefits can sometimes be 
obtained under the CPP/QPP plans. In Canada, provincial social assistance programs also 
typically recognize the needs of clients with disabilities. In principle, an Index of 
Economic Security should try to measure the adequacy, in total, of this coverage against 
an important source of risk to well-being – but the non-availability of comparable 
international data has thus far prevented us from doing so. Data non-availability is even 
more of a constraint for “Security in the event of ....other loss of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control” – indeed, it is far from clear to us conceptually what 
data might enable an analyst to distinguish between choice and “circumstances beyond 
his control” in the determination of low income. 
     
When we entirely omit consideration of these dimensions of (in)security we are 
implicitly setting the weight of these issues to zero. This is not satisfactory, but we do not 






























F. Aggregation of the Components of Economic Security into 
Overall Economic Security Domain Index   
 
The scaled values of the four components of the economic security domain are 
aggregated to obtain an overall scaled index for the domain. To do so, we must choose 
weights for each risk. One possible choice would be equal weighting, which would carry 
with it the implicit assumption that all the named risks are of equal importance. We think 
it more plausible that some risks are of greater salience, and affect more people more 
profoundly, than others. Hence, the IEWB has instead, up to now, chosen to construct 
weights for this aggregation procedure from the relative sizes of the populations deemed 
to be subject to each risk. 
 
In terms of the risk of unemployment, it is assumed that the entire population of 
working age (i.e.15 to 64 years) is subject to this risk. (In Canada, this was equivalent to 
about 68 per cent of the total population in 2007.) In terms of the financial risk associated 
with illness, it is assumed that 100 per cent of the population is at risk. In terms of the 
risk of single parent poverty, it is assumed that all married women and their children who 
are under 18 are at risk (about 33 per cent of the population in Canada in 2007). On the 
presumption that individuals only really start to worry about poverty in old age as their 
retirement years start to near, it is assumed that the population 45-64 are most at risk (27  
per cent of the Canadian population in 2007). The component specific weights are 
generated by adding up all the proportions of the population subject to the four risks (228 
in the Canadian case in 2007) and then standardizing to unity by dividing each proportion 
of the population affected by the risk by that total. In Canada in 2007, the weights for the 
four components of economic security were 0.146 for security from single-parent 
poverty; 0.117 for security from poverty in old age; 0.438 for security from the financial 
risk of illness; and 0.298 for security from unemployment.  
 
  Because the demographic structure of each country differs, and shifts over time, 
the proportion of the population affected by the different risks, and hence the weights, 
vary by country and over time. The contribution of each component is the product of its 
scaled value and weight. 
 
  Chart 10 presents the summary Index of Economic Security for all seven 
countries, while Chart 11 is a comparison of the 1980 start and the 2007 end-point. The 
immediately obvious lesson is the much lower level, and downward trend, of economic 
security in the United States – well before the advent of the current recession. The United 
States is not particularly an outlier in security from the costs of unemployment, but in all 
the other three dimensions of economic security it falls well short of the comparator 
nations. Largely because our new weighting for unemployment benefits in the costs of 
unemployment de-emphasizes the replacement rate of UI/EI benefits and ignores entirely 
the decline in UI/EI coverage in Canada, the IEWB Index of Economic Security shows 
essentially no change for Canadians.  Norwegians and Australians also had very small 
changes. In the United Kingdom there has been an improvement and in Germany and 
Sweden a deterioration in economic security – but in both level of economic security and 



































































































































































IV. Perennial Problems, Needed Revisions, and Possible 
Extensions 
 
A. Security in the Event of Unemployment 
 
The rapidity of the onset of the current global recession since late 2008 has been 
unprecedented.  If we continued to use only observed data, publication of an index based 
on such data would risk irrelevance to current social realities, since annual data on a 
cross-section of countries is still only available up to 2007. It is plausible to think that the 
insecurities felt in 2009 are quite different from those of 2007 – but the key issue is how 
much they might have changed. 
 
In most cases, the structures of national social welfare systems have not changed 
much since 2007, even if the circumstances they must cope with have experienced a 
shock. The design of health care systems, for example, still produces much the same risk 
of uncovered health care costs in 2009 as in 2007. In the United States, the maximum 
duration of state UI benefits has been extended by 13 weeks (and by 5 weeks in Canada) 
but other nations have not yet had to significantly change their unemployment benefits 
systems.  
 
The big change which a recession produces is in expectations of the 
unemployment rate – e.g. the OECD Interim Economic Outlook of March 2009 predicted 
that Canadian unemployment would rise from 6.1 per cent in 2008 to 8.8 per cent in 2009 
and 10.5 per cent in 2010. Charts 1 to 3 above have therefore incorporated  recent OECD 
forecasts of the unemployment rate for 2008-2010 to illustrate the impact of the current 
recession on security from unemployment, assuming that the replacement rates on 
earnings remain at their 2005 levels.   
 
In doing this calculation, we have accepted the fact that country-level 
unemployment rate projections are not available from the OECD for all nations. On the 
grounds of maintaining data comparability, we have also chosen not to look for 
supplemental forecasts from other sources for omitted countries (in this group of seven – 
Norway, Sweden and Australia). A striking feature of the data on Security from 
Unemployment 2008-2010 in the four remaining countries (Canada, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and United States), as shown in Chart 1, is their similarity. All four countries 
show a virtually identical level and identical steep decline in security from 
unemployment.  
 
As has already been mentioned, our methodology has changed from an equal, 
multiplicative weighting of the components of security from unemployment – probability 
of unemployment and expected replacement rate when qualified – to a four-fifths weight 
on probability of unemployment with the remainder weighted to the financial offset 
package. Chart 2 shows how much difference that makes over time, using the specific 
examples of Canada and the United States. As can be seen, each nation‟s fluctuations 
over time remain similar and the rank ordering of these three countries remains 
unchanged in almost all years. As one might expect, assigning greater weight to the 20 
 
unemployment rate has a greater magnitude of impact on our index of security for 
countries with relatively low unemployment (e.g. the United States in the late 1990s). 
 
B. Security in the Event of Sickness 
 
Three issues have been questioned as problematic in our index of “security in the 
event of sickness”: (1) our inability to make any allowance for the risk of uninsured 
earnings losses produced by sickness; (2) the difficulty of distinguishing between optional 
choices and medical necessities as components of uninsured medical expenditures and (3) 
the possibility that our index understates the qualitative differences between health care 
coverage systems – in particular, the differences in risk of medically induced personal 
bankruptcy between the United States and other countries.  
 
As Chart 4 and Chart 5 illustrate, the United States is an outlier in health cost 
insecurity, even with our current methodology. But in using the aggregate national 
percentage of disposable income spent on un-reimbursed health costs as our indicator of 
exposure to health care cost risk we have been criticized as implicitly doing two things – 
(1) assuming all health care costs to result from an exposure to risk – i.e. not be a 
discretionary choice and (2) averaging over all households, i.e. those with trivially small, 
as well as those with disastrously large, expenditures.  However, if the income elasticity of 
demand for discretionary health expenditures is similar across countries and if the 
insurance coverage of discretionary, medically unnecessary expenses is comparable, a 
simple model can be used to illustrate the irrelevance of discretionary expenditure to our 
rankings – see Appendix 1. We have no grounds for assuming that nationalities differ in 
underlying preference for medically unnecessary discretionary health care spending. 
 
Appendix 1 also addresses the issue of whether differences in average uncovered 
expenditures are a reasonable proxy for the relative level of anxiety felt about possible 
financial disaster for health reasons. In the United States, for example, the possibility of 
disastrously large health care bills (which may exceed coverage limits even for individuals 
with some health insurance) is a worst case outcome that has no real parallel in Canada or 
other countries with an effective public health care system. In general, the ability of 
individuals to cope with a given uninsured health care bill will depend on their income 
level, so part of the incidence of health care cost induced bankruptcies is due to the 
frequency of low incomes. Because the IEWB includes a separate income distribution 
segment, our discussion of health care risks focuses on the probability of bankruptcy for a 
person at a given income level. Nevertheless, if the distribution of the costs of health care 
events is non-linear, this implies that the distribution of risk of bankruptcy will also be 
non-linear in the percentage of health care costs covered by insurance.  
 
Appendix 1 provides an illustrative calculation of the relationship between the 
IEWB index of health care cost insecurity (i.e. the average uncovered percentage of health 
care costs) and the probability of personal bankruptcy, under the maintained hypothesis 
that the distribution of medically necessary health care costs is Paretian. In that specific 
case, the exact relationship is easily derived, but in general it will depend on the specific 
functional form, and the empirical parameters, of the probability distribution of medically 21 
 
necessary health care costs. Given that (a) we already can show that there is a one-to-one 
monotonic relationship between the average uncovered health care cost burden and the 
probability of health care cost bankruptcy, and (b) the United States is already a clear 
outlier in this dimension, we are left with the judgment call as to whether the benefits to 
deriving more exact estimates of this non-linear relationship exceed the costs in (a) 
research resources and (b) decreased index transparency. 
 
An alternative use of research resources would be to derive some estimate of the 
coverage of individuals against the hazard of loss of earnings in the event of illness. We 
have long known this to be a deficiency of the IEWB. 
 
C. Security in the Event of Old Age: Middle Class Security, Pension 
Adequacy and the Financial Melt-Down 
 
When we initially built the IEWB in 1998, we interpreted “security in the event of 
old age” as being protection against the hazard of poverty in old age.  We weighted this 
hazard by the percentage of the population who were aged 45 to 64 because we thought 
of insecurity as a forward-looking phenomenon. We had already counted the current 
experience of poverty among senior citizens under the economic equality component of 
the IEWB and in looking for an indicator of anxiety about the future, we assumed myopia 
among younger workers (we assumed that the retirement years only loom into subjective 
consciousness in a major way mid-way through the forties). 
 
As a practical matter, in the Canadian context, by focusing on the poverty rate and 
depth among seniors, the design of Canada‟s old age security system means that our 
measure primarily picked up those who had minimal public pension entitlements under 
CPP/QPP.  Because we assumed that the issue that produces economic anxiety about old 
age is the probability and depth of poverty among senior citizens, we were ignoring the 
worries of the more affluent, at least to the extent they stayed non-poor. We did not think 
of “security in the event of …. old age” as being about the anxiety that someone might 
feel about possibly being unable to fully maintain a middle-class or more affluent 
lifestyle.  And the implicit assumption throughout was that private retirement savings – 
either in directly held wealth or private pension plan entitlements – were a source of 
greater security, not a producer of anxieties.  
 
Is this still the most reasonable way to think of economic security in the event of 
old age in 2009? Chart 12 below is taken from the OECD and documents the dramatic 
recent decline in value in pension fund assets; during 2008, the real return on those assets 
was -23.9 per cent in Canada and -25.8 per cent in the United States (OECD, 2009a). 
Even more dramatic graphics could be provided by the year to year change in housing 
prices or stock market indices in different countries.  
 
From the perspective of security in the event of old age, the exposure of 
individuals to these trends in asset prices depends on the extent to which they have such 
assets, whether they are contractually protected, and the current credibility of such 
contract protections. For example, financial market fluctuation affects the value of assets 22 
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held by pension plans. A major difference between defined contribution (DC) pension 
plans and defined benefit (DB) pension plans is that DC plans place the financial risk on 
the pensioner, whereas in the case of DB plans the risk is assumed by the employer.
14 The 
proportion of retirement savings in DC versus DB plans is therefore an important 
determinant of the overall risk faced by aging workers. These details differ dramatically 
across countries. Broadbent et al. (2006:14) report, for example, that in 2004/05, 77.1 per 
cent of pension plan members in Canada were in DB type plans, but in the United States 
the corresponding percentage was 28 per cent.   
 
The percentage of the labour force covered by private pension plans, of either DB 
or DC form, has been declining over time in Canada (see Morisette and Ostrovsky, 
2006), and for the uncovered, variation in pension plan assets are irrelevant to their 
current sense of security. But even for workers with long established DB pension plans, 
the current recession has raised new questions about how much of the pensions 
previously anticipated from Defined Benefit plans will, in the end, be paid. This 
uncertainty, even for particular pension plans, is necessarily magnified if we are to 
estimate the risk exposure of all near-retirement individuals. 
 
                                                 
14 In Canada, Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) include both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. 
Canadians also have access to Registered Retirement Saving Plans (RRSPs). These are not employer 
pensions like RPPs, although they share the DC-type characteristic that that there is no guaranteed or 
defined benefit. Unlike RPPs, RRSPs can be bequested.   
Chart 12: Real Pension Fund Returns, Selected OECD Countries, per cent, 
January-October 2008 23 
 
As Wolff (1991) has discussed, a comprehensive accounting of personal wealth 
should include both the private assets of individuals and the present value of their 
expected benefits from public pensions. The security of individuals as they near their 
retirement depends on their access to both types of “augmented wealth”. Hence, the level 
of security in old age of people at different points in the income distribution depends on 
the details of the structure of their nations old age security system – which poses an 
important conceptual problem, as a comparison of Canada and the United States may 
illustrate. 
 
As Chart 8 and Chart 9 illustrated, if the issue in “Security in the event of old age” 
is seen as security from poverty in old age, the United States does relatively poorly 
compared to Canada, largely because the earnings-related portion of the Canadian old age 
security system is supplemented by a universal pension and a negative income tax, via 
the OAS/GIS system. However, if the issue in “Security in the event of …. old age” is 
better perceived as enabling “dignity in one‟s old age” and if this is interpreted as 
receiving a pension or other income that enables some approximation of an individual‟s 
previous style of life to be maintained, then the Canada/US comparison is far from clear. 
In Canada, the earnings-related component of old age security under CPP/QPP has a 
fairly low ceiling on pensionable earnings ($46,300 in 2009) implying a modest $908.75 
per month as maximum pension entitlement. In the United States in 2009, Social Security 
contributions are payable on earnings up to $106,800, and the maximum monthly pension 
payable is $3,253 (if taken at age 70, but dropping to $2,410 if taken at age 66).
15 Both 
countries index public pensions for inflation using a Consumer Price Index. The 
conundrum is that middle class Americans are substantially more protected by public 
pensions from the risk of a decline in their living standard following retirement than 
middle class Canadians, even if there is a greater risk of poverty in old age in the United 
States, compared to Canada. 
 
Although the OECD has been willing to publish (see Chart 13) estimates of 
adequacy for various „typical‟ pension plan configurations (OECD, 2009), it is unclear 
how to summarize the total risk exposure of these configurations, particularly given the 
substantial proportion of the population who never gain entitlement to private pensions. 
But it is clear that the details of public pension plan coverage and the solvency and 
coverage of private pension plans offer great complexity in any estimation of the 
exposure of the middle class to „life style‟ uncertainty in old age.  
 
The „bottom line‟ of this discussion is that insecurity in the sense of anxiety about 
poverty in old age is not necessarily the same as insecurity about a general maintenance 
of „middle class‟ consumption lifestyle. However, the details of pension adequacy for 
life-style maintenance are complex, problematic to summarize and difficult to observe in 
longitudinal data sets in a given country, much less in internationally comparable 
longitudinal data. Such indicators of income maintenance as do exist imply that countries 
do not necessarily rank similarly on indicators of both middle class adequacy and old age 
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Chart 13: Potential Replacement Ratio at Normal Retirement Age, Selected 
OECD Countries, 2008 25 
 
                           
poverty prevention – compare, for example, the position of the United States in Chart 13 
and in Chart 9. 
 
By contrast, the focus of the IEWB on whether or not elderly people are income 
poor in old age relies on a relatively straightforward measurement, which can be directly 
observed in comparable cross-sectional household surveys, such as LIS data.  
Feelings of financial insecurity are also driven partly by continuing fears of 
specific discrete events (like the loss of a house due to foreclosure), partly by the loss of 
potential future consumption due to the vaporization of aggregate wealth since 2007, and 
also by the extreme degree of day-to-day within-period volatility in asset prices, which 
has driven a new level of distrust of financial markets. But we do not have a good way to 
measure such free-floating subjective anxieties.  
 
Heslop (2009:9) has also commented: “The decision to focus only on those aged 
45-64 seems question-begging, first because anticipation is not the only source of 
anxiety, and second, because those 65 and over in the modern world may expect to live 
many more years if not decades, so they have plenty to worry about.” Chart 14 shows the 
sensitivity of our aggregate index of security to this choice of population weight – taking 
the polar opposite point of view that everyone hopes to get old, and therefore presuming 
that 100 per cent of the population has reason to worry about poverty in old age. 
 
 
Chart 14: Sensitivity Analysis of the Index of Economic Security, Canada and the 




















































































































































United States (Original Weights)
United States (Alternative Weights)
Note: Original weights assume that only the population aged 45-64 is affected by old-age poverty. The 
alternative weights assume that 100 per cent of the population is affected by old-age poverty.26 
 
D. Security in the Event of Widowhood 
 
As noted above, we have interpreted this as “the risk of single (female) parent 
poverty” and we have ignored the poverty probability of male single parents.  Is it fair to 
argue that we have thereby maintained an anti-male gender bias implicit in the 
(exclusionary) reference to “widowhood” in the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights? 
 
If the IEWB is to be „gender-neutral‟ as an over-all index, then presumably any 
poverty of single male parents, and the poverty of children in male single parent 
households, should be included in the IEWB – and it is. The economic equality 
component of the IEWB counts the poverty rate and poverty gap of all household types. 
Here, however, we are concerned with insecurity in the sense of “the anxiety produced by 
a lack of economic safety”, so the question is whether men and women have the same 
subjective, forward-looking anxiety about the prospect of poverty in the event of family 
break-up. We think that males and females feel this anxiety quite differently, for both 
objective and cultural reasons. Although some men may fear the prospect of poverty due 
to desertion by their wives, we think it is really only realism to recognize that far more 
women have such anxieties. 
 
 
V. Implications and Conclusions 
 
  Chart 15 summarizes our Index of Economic Security for Canada,
16 Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, including the OECD forecasts for 2008, 2009 and 
2010 data. Although it is clear that our measure of economic security is now trending 
down for all four countries, the rate of decline is not nearly as precipitous as the recent 
decline in output in these countries. This  makes sense, because the structure of the health 
care, social welfare, unemployment benefit and public pension systems in these countries 
is largely unchanged, implying that although „security in the event of unemployment‟ has 
deteriorated sharply, the recession has brought no real change to the other three 
components of our economic security index. Although newspaper headlines may tell us 
daily of the impacts of the recession on particular firms and on labour markets, Chart 14 
may also serve as a reminder that the mechanisms of the modern welfare state that 
mitigate other aspects of economic security remain in place. 
 
                                                 
16Since the data we have available for international comparisons do not allow us to consider the impact of 
declining UI/EI coverage on the unemployment security of Canadians, the relative position of Canada, 
compared to Germany, since 1995 in Chart 14 is undoubtedly overstated. However, the ordering of 
countries is not likely to change – most of the weight in the unemployment security component is assigned 
to the unemployment rate, and it is just one of the four components of Economic Security.   27 
 




   
  This report has demonstrated that in one respect, the economic security 
component of the IEWB can be easily extended, using forecasts of the unemployment 
rate, to model the change in economic security induced by a recessionary downturn in the 
labour market. But this particular recession has been driven by the “most dangerous 
shock in mature financial markets since the 1930s” (IMF, 2008) and, in combining 
financial market crises and a downturn in real economic activity, has created previously 
unimagined anxieties about the ability of capital markets to guarantee future retirement 
security for many members of the upper middle class. Our index of „economic security‟ 
has emphasized security against the risk of poverty, and the IEWB should be interpreted 
in that light. However, the peculiar nature of the current recession has also raised the 
question as to whether a broader and more complex measure of „economic security‟ 
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Appendix 1: Relating Out-of-Pocket Health Care 
Expenditures to Bankruptcy 
 
Assume that health care expenditures Hijt for the i
th person in period t in country j 
(who has income equal to Yijt) can be classified either as “medically necessary” Mijt or 
“Discretionary” Dijt.  
 
  Our basic identity is: 
 
  Hijt =  Mijt +  Dijt.  
 
For most of this note, we suppress the notation for country j, period t, and refer to 
individual i as receiving medically necessary services Mi and making discretionary 
expenditures Di, and having income of Yi .  
 
Discretionary expenditures are, in general, determined by the relative price of 
medical services and by personal income, but if all individuals face the same prices in a 
given country at a given time and if we assume demand to be iso-elastic, all the variation 
in demand for discretionary health care expenditure is determined by relative income. If 
discretionary expenditures are linearly related to personal income, we have: 
 
[1]  Di =   Yi 
 
We assume that medically necessary expenditures arise because accidents and 
illnesses happen randomly to people and that they give rise to a probability distribution of 
medically necessary expenditures whose frequency distribution is described by: 
 
[2]  Mi = g (m) 
 
We define    and   as mean medically necessary and discretionary expenditure 
for a population of size n. 
 
[3A]  Mi g(m) 




Assume that individual  i  is reimbursed for a proportion of health care costs, or 
(equivalently) that some proportion of identical individuals are covered under health 
insurance, and that the insurance coverage of medically necessary and discretionary 
expenditure is given by: 
 
[4]  ai = a (Mi) 
[5]  di = d (Di) 
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The out of pocket, non-reimbursed portion of health care costs     for individual 
i is then given by: 
 
[6]   
 
In total, unreimbursed health care costs are: 
 
[7]   
 
In the “health care cost security” sub-component of the IEWB we use average 
unreimbursed health care costs as a percentage of average personal disposable income.  
We can call this IEWB and compute it as in: 
 
[8]  IEWB =   
  =   
 
If we are comparing two countries at a point in time, we will be interested 
typically in the difference between health security scores, as [9]. 
 
[9]  IEWBj – IEWBj’  
  =   
 
The first term in square brackets is what we want to measure, while the second 
squared bracket term is the error introduced by the fact that measured health care 
spending includes both medically necessary and discretionary components. It disappears 
if  j =  j and dj = dj  [i.e., the income effect and the insurance coverage of discretionary 
health spending are the same across nations]. If we just assume that    j =  j (which can 
be called the “equal hypochondriatic income elasticity” assumption and can be defended 
as the standard economic assumption when we have no evidence to suggest unequal 
preferences) then the error reduces to: 
 
 [ j dj    j dj] =  j [dj   dj]  
 
Since  j is likely to be a number of the order of 0.05, and [dj   dj] is unlikely to 
be large, their product (i.e., the error) will be small.  
 
The question remains as to whether average per capita uncovered costs are an 
adequate proxy for “insecurity” if people are in fact worried about the probability of 
“medical disasters” that they cannot pay for.  Let us call this Prob (B) – i.e., probability 
of medical bankruptcy. 
 
Define f(y)  frequency density of income y. 
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F(y) =   = cumulative distribution function of income y 
 
We assumed a probability distribution of medically necessary expenditures g(M) 
with corresponding cumulative distribution function G(M). 
 
Suppose that a financially disastrous medical event is defined as having 
uncovered expenditures greater than some multiple c of an individual‟s income – i.e. 
. The critical incident is defined by  . Note that if coverage of 
costs is complete, a=1 and the critical health incident is impossible, i.e., happens only if 
. 
 
So, for any individual, at income level Yi the probability of a financially 
disastrous event is: 
 
 [10]        
 
If we are willing to assume that g(M) is similar across nations (perhaps because 
we assume similar efficiency of treatment and probability of illness), and if we are also 
willing to assume c is the same (equal access to credit) then across countries the 
insecurity faced by a person at income level  yi depends only on (1-a) – which is what we 
measured in equation [9]. 
 
Note that this is NOT the same as saying equation [10] will measure cross-
country differences in risk of medical bankruptcies. The average probability of 
bankruptcy depends on both f(y) – the distribution of income – and g(M) (1-a) the risk of 
uncovered health care costs. 
 
[11]       
                       
 
The practical meaning of this, when we compare the United States with other 
countries, is that our sub-index for „security in the event of sickness‟ captures the 
difference in economic security from the risk of uncovered health care costs for people at 
a given income level. What we do not measure – and arguably should not measure in the 
security component of the IEWB, since the IEWB has a separate Income Distribution 
component – is the greater number of people who, in a more unequal society, will 
experience medical bankruptcy because their incomes are lower than they would have 
been in a more equal society. 
 
  For two individuals (1 and 2) with the same income y and same access to capital 
c, the expense of the critical “bankruptcy inducing medical event” is determined only by 






  If the frequency distribution of medical costs is governed by a similar Paretian 










Relative odds of bankruptcy are then: 
 
 
 
 